---
title: Audit and compliance export
description: Export one period's evidence of who approved what with venom audit export, and check it offline with venom audit verify-export.
section: reference
order: 100
audience: [operator, user]
sources: [docs/audit-export.md, docs/provenance.md]
features: [reference.doc-audit-export]
---

Regulated teams need evidence of who approved what. `venom audit export` writes one period's evidence to a directory, and `venom audit verify-export` checks it on any machine, offline, with no repository and no network.

```bash
venom audit export --month 2026-10 --out ./audit-2026-10
venom audit verify-export ./audit-2026-10 --trust <key id> --policy-keys ./policy-keys
```

The period is `[since, until)` in UTC: `--month YYYY-MM`, or `--since` and `--until` as `YYYY-MM-DD`.

This is the laptop's side. The organisation's side (members, keys, spend, controls, access, retention, provider keys, incidents) is Venom Cloud's compliance pack, a signed ZIP from Settings, Compliance in the console, checked with `venom compliance verify <pack.zip> [--fingerprint "<fp>"]`.

## What the directory holds {#contents}

| File | Content |
|---|---|
| `receipts.jsonl` | One line per commit of the period (`--rev`, default `HEAD`) that carries a signed provenance receipt: the commit, its date, the receipt, its digest, and `bound` (the receipt matched the commit's tree and parents at export). |
| `approvals.jsonl` | The audit log's `ask` records of the period: every call the policy sent to a person, with the answer, how it was given and the mode. |
| `policies/<seq>.json` | The signed organisation policy envelopes issued in the period, byte for byte, from `~/.venom/policy-history` (written by `venom policy sync`) or `--policies <dir>`, plus the current policy file. |
| `manifest.json` | The period, the SHA-256 and size of every file, counts (commits, commits without a receipt, receipts, approvals, human approvals, policy versions), the audit log's chain state at export, and an Ed25519 signature by this machine's provenance key. |

## What verify-export checks {#verify}

- The manifest's signature, and that its signer is this machine's key or one named with `--trust`.
- Every listed file against its hash, and that nothing else is in the directory.
- Every receipt's signature and digest.
- Every approval line is an `ask` record inside the period.
- Every policy envelope's signature against the policy keys (`<kid>.pub` files; default `/etc/venom/policy-keys`, or `--policy-keys <dir>`). With no policy keys it fails rather than skipping; `--skip-policy-signatures` skips on purpose.

Exit codes: 0 all passed, 1 something failed, 2 a usage error.

## Limits {#limits}

- The manifest signature proves the bundle is what the exporting machine signed, not that the machine was honest. Receipts and policy envelopes carry their own signatures, which an auditor can check without trusting the exporter.
- A receipt's binding to its commit needs the repository, so it is checked at export (`bound`), not offline.
- Commits without a receipt are counted (`commitsWithoutReceipt`), not hidden.
- Approval lines are not a slice of the hash chain. The manifest records whether the audit log's chains held at export; the original log stays the source for a full check.
- Policy versions issued before `venom policy sync` started keeping history are not in `~/.venom/policy-history`.

## Related

- [Glossary](/docs/reference/glossary.md)
- [Error codes](/docs/reference/errors.md)
