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Audit and compliance export

Export one period's evidence of who approved what with venom audit export, and check it offline with venom audit verify-export.

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Regulated teams need evidence of who approved what. venom audit export writes one period's evidence to a directory, and venom audit verify-export checks it on any machine, offline, with no repository and no network.

venom audit export --month 2026-10 --out ./audit-2026-10
venom audit verify-export ./audit-2026-10 --trust <key id> --policy-keys ./policy-keys

The period is [since, until) in UTC: --month YYYY-MM, or --since and --until as YYYY-MM-DD.

This is the laptop's side. The organisation's side (members, keys, spend, controls, access, retention, provider keys, incidents) is Venom Cloud's compliance pack, a signed ZIP from Settings, Compliance in the console, checked with venom compliance verify <pack.zip> [--fingerprint "<fp>"].

What the directory holds

File Content
receipts.jsonl One line per commit of the period (--rev, default HEAD) that carries a signed provenance receipt: the commit, its date, the receipt, its digest, and bound (the receipt matched the commit's tree and parents at export).
approvals.jsonl The audit log's ask records of the period: every call the policy sent to a person, with the answer, how it was given and the mode.
policies/<seq>.json The signed organisation policy envelopes issued in the period, byte for byte, from ~/.venom/policy-history (written by venom policy sync) or --policies <dir>, plus the current policy file.
manifest.json The period, the SHA-256 and size of every file, counts (commits, commits without a receipt, receipts, approvals, human approvals, policy versions), the audit log's chain state at export, and an Ed25519 signature by this machine's provenance key.

What verify-export checks

  • The manifest's signature, and that its signer is this machine's key or one named with --trust.
  • Every listed file against its hash, and that nothing else is in the directory.
  • Every receipt's signature and digest.
  • Every approval line is an ask record inside the period.
  • Every policy envelope's signature against the policy keys (<kid>.pub files; default /etc/venom/policy-keys, or --policy-keys <dir>). With no policy keys it fails rather than skipping; --skip-policy-signatures skips on purpose.

Exit codes: 0 all passed, 1 something failed, 2 a usage error.

Limits

  • The manifest signature proves the bundle is what the exporting machine signed, not that the machine was honest. Receipts and policy envelopes carry their own signatures, which an auditor can check without trusting the exporter.
  • A receipt's binding to its commit needs the repository, so it is checked at export (bound), not offline.
  • Commits without a receipt are counted (commitsWithoutReceipt), not hidden.
  • Approval lines are not a slice of the hash chain. The manifest records whether the audit log's chains held at export; the original log stays the source for a full check.
  • Policy versions issued before venom policy sync started keeping history are not in ~/.venom/policy-history.